Rescuing Tit-for-Tat with Source Coding

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Motivation: Solutions in practice

Do popular file sharing networks guarantee a fair sharing of resources? Examples: > FastTrack: No. "Participation level" can be manipulated. > eDonkey: No. Local credits can improve the peer's position in the queue, but otherwise no incentives to upload. > Gnutella: No.

There are many studies about free riding on Gnutella. Most users do not share anything! The free riding client BitTh

➢ BitTorrent: No.

The free riding client BitThief never uploads anything!

Its weak incentive mechanism encourages users to upload, but uploading is not enforced.





Motivation: Collaboration is mandatory!

P2P computing has many advantages over the traditional client server model:

- Increased scalability
- Better use of bandwidth
- Fault tolerance

≻...

However, it only works if peers cooperate \rightarrow All p2p systems crucially depend on collaboration!

How can collaboration be guaranteed?

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Motivation: Incentive Mechanisms

1. BitTorrent uses a tit-for-tat-like mechanism where uploading peers are favored. All peers repeatedly get a chance to reciprocate ("optimistic unchoking").

Weaknesses of BitTorrent:

Seeders do not only "seed" the file, they give it out for free!

- > The seeders can be exploited.
- The "optimistic unchoking" can be exploited.

These weaknesses can also be considered "features"...

2. A centralized server to enforce fair sharing could be used: Every data exchange is monitored by the server. Weaknesses of this approach:

- Limited scalability
- Single point of failure...







Motivation: Why not Tit-for-Tat?

Tit-for-tat is believed to be the most effective strategy to enforce collaboration.


Initially cooperate and then respond in kind to the other peer's previous action!



Why isn't this simple strategy used in file sharing networks???

Short answer: Because it does not work (if applied directly):

• Bootstrap problem: Initially, peers have nothing to share.





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
Outline

- I. Motivation
- II. System Overview
- III. Evaluation
- IV. Conclusion

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Motivation: Selfish Behavior



What can be done to solve this problem ...?

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System Overview: Source Coding

Basic idea: If m blocks from a much larger set of blocks suffice to reconstruct the file and much more than m blocks are in circulation ("block diversity"), the deadlock problem can be mitigated!



How can the block diversity be increased? The blocks are encoded at the seeders (source coding):


k random blocks are combined into a new block.

The total number of blocks increases from m to *m* choose *k* (# blocks $\in O(m^k)$)!

How are the blocks encoded?



System Overview: Finite Field



System Overview: Algebra

All basic arithmetic operations are efficient:

What:	How:
e ₁ +e ₂	Bitwise addition + add carry-over bit
-е	Flip all bits
e ₁ ×e ₂	Bitwise multiplication (using addition from above)
1/e	Extended Euclidean Algorithm

How many blocks are added up? How can the original blocks be reconstructed?



Chosen randomly

from all *m* choose

k possible blocks!

It is cheap to

be (and remain)

a seeder!

seeder

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System Overview: Seeder Strategy

The following rules prevent free riders from exploiting the seeders:

• Each peer can download *only* a small, *specific*

• If there are n peers and m blocks, the seeders adaptively set the size of this subset to $t \approx m/n$.

Advantages of this approach:

> Different peers obtain entirely different blocks.

- \rightarrow Large block diversity!
- Leechers are forced to collaborate.
- > Seeders have to provide only little data.



