Payment Channels

Designing Secure Watchtowers

Zeta Avarikioti

Can cryptocurrencies scale?

7 tx/s

20 tx/s

65.000 tx/s

Payment Channels

Payment Channels

Payment Channels

Funding transaction



Payment Channels

Funding transaction





Payment Channels

Funding transaction



Alice sends 3btc







Payment Channels

Funding transaction



Alice sends 3btc



Bob sends 6btc









Payment Network




LORER [TESTNET]
1099 NODES
3502 CHANNELS
FAQ
Supported by

Lightning Channels



Attack



Watchtowers



Why be a Watchtower?

Why be a Watchtower?

Assuming rational parties and watchtowers…

- Will a party commit fraud? 
- Will a watchtower get paid? 
- Will a party commit fraud? 
- Will a watchtower get paid? 
- Will a party commit fraud? ... 

Why be a Watchtower?

Watchtowers → Parties ↓	Active	Inactive
Fraud		
No Fraud		



Why be a Watchtower?

Premiums

Watchtowers → Parties ↓	Active	Inactive
Fraud		
No Fraud		



Why be an active Watchtower?

Collateral

Bitcoin

- ➔ **UTXO-based (Unspent Transaction Output)**
- ➔ **Transaction: consumes & produces UTXOs**
- ➔ **Multi-signatures: σ_{AB}**
- ➔ **Timelocks: Δt**

Lightning Channels



Cerberus Channels



Cerberus Channels



Cerberus Channels



[Avarikioti, Tyfronitis-Litos, Wattenhofer. *Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin*.]

Fundamentals of Channels



Fundamentals of Channels



Fundamentals of Channels





- ➔ Eclipse
- ➔ Censor
- ➔ Congestion

Funding

Commitment

Dispute period

Time = CryptoMoney!

Time = CryptoMoney!

Be proactive, not reactive

Be proactive, not reactive





Signatures of Alice & Bob
OR
Signatures of ⅔ WT & (Alice or Bob)

Challenges



1) Consensus is costly
2) Privacy is important
3) Incentives are critical

Consistent Broadcast



- ➔ O(n) communication complexity for state updates
- ➔ Verification of consensus between Alice & Bob
- ➔ No liveness guarantees, if Alice & Bob both misbehave
- ➔ Consensus needed only for closing, if there is a dispute

Encrypted State



➔ Privacy preserving

➔ Alice/Bob cannot publish a previous transaction

Brick Architecture

(3) Execute

H( )

(1) Update

(3) Execute

H( )

(2) Consistent Broadcast

H( )

(2) Consistent Broadcast



Incentives

➔ Unilateral channel for fees:
Repeated game lifts fair exchange impossibility

➔ Collateral for anti-bribing:
Reduction to fair-exchange
WT Committee size ↑ → per WT collateral ↓

Brick Advantages

- ➔ **Asynchronous channels**
- ➔ **Security even under L1 failure**
- ➔ **Privacy**
- ➔ **Incentive-compatible**
- ➔ **Embarrassingly parallel**
- ➔ **Linear communication**



[Avarikioti, Kokoris-Kogias, Wattenhofer. *Brick: Asynchronous State Channels*.]

- ➔ Avarikioti, Tyfronitis-Litos, Wattenhofer. *Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin*. Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2020.
- ➔ Avarikioti, Kokoris-Kogias, Wattenhofer. *Brick: Asynchronous State Channels.*